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Context-aware Anomaly Detector for Monitoring Cyber Attacks
on Automotive CAN Bus
ABSTRACT
Automotive electronics is rapidly expanding. An average vehicle
contains million lines of software codes, running on 100 of elec-
tronic control units (ECUs), in supporting number of safety, driver
assistance and infotainment functions. These ECUs are networked
using a Controller Area Network (CAN). Security of the CAN bus
has not historically been a major concern, however, recent research
demonstrate that CAN has many vulnerabilities to cyber attacks.
This paper presents a contextualised anomaly detector for monitor-
ing cyber attacks on the CAN bus. Proposed algorithm is based on
message sequence modelling, using so called N-grams distributions.
It utilises only benign data (one class) for training and threshold
estimation. Performance of the algorithm was tested against two
different attack scenarios, RPM and gear gauge messages spoofing,
using data captured from a real vehicle. Experimental outcomes
demonstrate that proposed algorithm is capable of detecting both
attacks with %100 accuracy, using far smaller time windows (100ms)
which is essential for a practically deployable automotive cyber
security solution.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Modern automobiles are increasingly becoming intelligent and
smarter, offering range of exciting new features such as telemat-
ics, advanced driver assistance and augmented reality displays. An
average vehicle contains a million lines of software codes running
on 100 of micro computers (known as ECUs) to facilitate these
services [28]. These ECUs spread over the entire vehicle and largely
connected to one another using bus-based network called CAN, low
latency, low overhead high performance bus standard. Moreover
modern vehicles have number of external communication inter-
faces to communicate with the outside world, for example, with
personal devices, vehicular ad-hoc networks and the Internet. Esti-
mates show that 75% of cars shipped globally by 2020 will be built
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or
with the necessary hardware to connect to the internet [1]. Despite
the fact that security of some of these connections and software
codes may be strengthened by automotive manufactures or original
equipment manufacturers (OEMs), having so many lines of codes
and increased connectivity extends the potential attack surface that
can be exploited by a cyber criminal. Security researchers demon-
strate that their ability to implement attacks to real vehicles [30].
Vehicle hacks are potentially disastrous. Illegitimately accessing
and modifying data in a vehicle is not only a security issue but also
a safety issue. For example, corrupted ECU driving the brakes can
lead to an accident with serious consequences for passengers, peo-
ple and goods in the surrounding environment. Therefore security
of connected and autonomous vehicles is a big concern for auto-
motive manufacturers and OEMs who are now seeking methods to
secure their products against Cyberattacks.
Security research in this area has taken many forms, encom-
passing anything from hardware security to encryption of various
aspects of the vehicle (see Section 2.2). One of the larger areas of
research identified was the need for the traffic stream of the inter-
nal vehicle to be in some way monitored for potentially malicious
behaviour. This paper focuses on contextualising anomaly detec-
tion on the intra-vehicular network bus (see Section 2.1). Anomaly
detection for security monitoring on the CAN bus has been difficult
due to the fact that many actions or reactions on a vehicle can be
construed as anomalous; for example, an emergency braking event
carried out by the driver, whilst legitimate, is always anomalous in
day-to-day driving scenarios. To mitigate or avoid false positives,
context is required to tell between a legitimate anomaly and one
that could be interpreted as a potentially malicious action.
The contribution of this paper starts bymodelling of normal CAN
behaviour, thenwe propose a novel context-aware anomaly detector
using n-gram distributions. The main features of the proposed
algorithm can be summarised as follows.
(1) The algorithm depends only on benign data (one class) for
the training purpose and threshold estimation. This avoids
the need of large amount of realistic attack data for model
building. Collecting benign data for training purpose is rela-
tively easier in our problem than collecting attack data.
(2) It is lightweight and can be used to detect anomalous CAN
messages in real time. Algorithm is capable of picking up
anomalies using far smaller time windows (e.g. 100ms). This
is an essential feature for a practically deployable automotive
cyber security solution.
(3) Threshold is estimated in a systematic way only using benign
training data. With the estimated threshold, attack messages
are assigned higher anomaly certainty scores, resulting in
100% accuracy rates of attack detection.
(4) It does not depend on prior knowledge of the CAN ID and
its purpose which is not generally shared by the vehicle
manufacturer. This feature enables the proposed algorithm
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Figure 1: Demonstrative CAN network topology with the
proposed solution fitted as an ECU.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 lays out
the background including related work in this field. Section 3 pro-
vides a description of the proposed algorithm and its mathematical
basis. Section 4.1 details the dataset used in this work. Section 4.2
provides a description of experimental design, with Section 4.3 ex-
ploring the results and discussions thereof. Conclusions and future
work are discussed in Section 5.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we give the background on the ubiquitous automo-
tive CAN protocol and then explore related work in this field.
2.1 Controller Area Network (CAN)
The CAN protocol is a ubiquitous and pervasive standard of intra-
vehicular networking, the latest of which (CAN 2.0) is formally
embodied in a specification document by Bosch in 1991. It is a
broadcast protocol, with no addressing facilities. Instead, every ECU
receives every message, but only acts on those that it is specified
to recognise. Arbitration is bitwise; and every ECU in the vehicle
needs to be synchronised to sample every bit at the same time,
with dominant bits being the logical ‘0’ and the recessive bit being
‘1’. Each message is prefixed with (amongst other things) with a
CAN ID which identifies the priority of the message: the lower the
CAN ID, the higher the priority. The CAN ID and its purpose is not
generally shared by the vehicle manufacturer.
Due to its origin in non-connected vehicles, security of the CAN
bus has not historically been a major concern, however, recent
research demonstrate that CAN has many vulnerabilities to cyber
attacks due to the broadcast transmission nature of communica-
tion, and the lack of encryption and authentication. This makes it
susceptible to attacks, such as injection [10], replay [3], fuzzing [8],
flooding [2] or through lack of space within the protocol to embed
meaningful security such as encryption (although there have been
proposals [15]). In many cases ECUs are exposed through external
interfaces. For example, Miller et al. exploited a Wi-Fi port of a
popular Jeep model to gain access and reprogram its ECUs. Authors
managed to control a wide range of automotive functions remotely
(e.g. disabling brake and stopping engine) [21]. The attack surface
presented by the vehicle has grown due to the addition of Bluetooth,
Wi-Fi and 4G in car technology exposing weaker CAN protocol.
2.2 Related work
An increased number of automotive malicious attacks have been
noted in recent years. Consequently, research into anomaly detec-
tion on the automotive CAN bus has surged. This is primarily due to
technological advances in vehicles manufacture and the insufficient
security provisions offered by the CAN protocol. Several attempts
aiming at enhancing the CAN bus security had been proposed. Au-
thors in [16] have used a specification-based approach for intrusion
detection on the vehicle network, while [19] proposed a method of
blocking unauthorised data transmission on the CAN bus. In [9],
authors have proposed three anomaly detection measures, which
involve detection of an abnormal frequency of cyclic messages,
characteristics observation of low level communication and detec-
tion of message IDs misuse. Additionally, frequency-based anomaly
detection using network traffic characteristics was used for intru-
sion detection systems in [26]. This concept was adapted from the
work conducted in [29], which statistically evaluates anomaly de-
tection in industrial control system traffic. Such detection methods
can result in good accuracy and low false-positive rate, however,
their application is limited to periodic traffic. A detection model
based on time interval anomalies of CAN messages is proposed in
[27]. Moreover, authors in [23] have used generative adversarial
networks for attack detection on the CAN bus. They have used
randomly generated fake attacks to train their models, as opposed
to data from real attacks. Entropy-based attack detection mecha-
nism for CAN networks is presented in [22]. In [5] authors have
proposed carefully constructed defence messages to block attackers
permanently. Authors in [25] have applied time interval analysis for
intrusion detection. Their system was designed to detect message
injection attacks. In [18], authors have proposed an intrusion de-
tection algorithm that aims to identify malicious injected messages.
The algorithm’s detection performance was demonstrated through
experiments conducted on real traffic.
Though various studies have been published on anomaly de-
tection on the automotive CAN bus, none of them focus on con-
textualising the anomaly detection. Inspecting alerts generated by
an anomaly detector is not sufficient to identify the cause. Iden-
tifying the context of the CAN messages can provide meanings
behind events, which consequently would reduce false alarms in
complex scenarios. A recent comprehensive survey on intrusion
detection for in-vehicle networks had been published [30], none of
the stated works focus on context-aware anomaly detection. This
paper presents contextualised anomaly detection for monitoring
cyber attacks on the CAN bus network, therefore, this work is
different and unique.













































































































































We inspired by the successful applications of sequence modelling
techniques in other areas, particularly, use cases like speech recog-
nition, language translation and sentiment analysis in natural lan-
guage processing. Video activity recognition is another trending
use case of successful application of sequence modelling techniques,
in which the model predicts which activity is going on based on
input sequence of frames. Nevertheless, the most of data in real
life are in the form of sequences, for example, it can be a number
sequence, character sequence, network traffic sequence, image pixel
sequence, a video frame sequence or an audio sequence, and the
mathematical models have to map these input data to an output
which can also be a sequence or a scalar. In our problem, the input
would be a sequence of CAN messages and proposed algorithm
has to map them into a label, in streaming fashion as illustrated in
figure 2. In the rest of this section, we will discuss how to achieve
this task using n-grams distributions [11].
As mentioned in Section 2.1, CAN bus is a robust vehicle bus
standard designed for connecting ECUs and embedded computing
devices, referred as nodes hereafter, to communicate with each
other. Two or more such nodes are required to communicate and
the complexity of a node can range from a simple I/O device to an
embedded computing device with sophisticated software. Amodern
automobile contains about 100 of such nodes supporting various
safety critical subsystems in a vehicle, e.g. engine control, airbags,
ABS, power windows etc. Though some of these subsystems func-
tion independently, communications with others are essential to
control actuators and receive necessary feedback from other sen-
sors. Thus some nodes constantly broadcast their message(s) while
others broadcast in responding to an event (e.g. operator’s com-
mand). This forms arbitrarily long message sequences on the CAN
bus which can be mathematically modelled and used to predict
subsequent element(s) in the sequence, and hence to anomaly de-
tection.
3.1 N-gram modelling for the CAN bus
Let E = {e1, e2, e3, ..., em } be a finite set of nodes in a CAN network.
A is the massage alphabet. J={1,2,3,...,m} is an index set. Node ei
broadcasts the message si . Then A = {si |∀i ∈ J}. As mentioned
above CAN messages (i.e. si ∈ A) carry everything from operator
commands (e.g. roll down the windows) to readouts from sensors
(e.g. reporting engine temperature) and constantly flow on the CAN
bus. This process forms arbitrarily long repetitive or non-repetitive
message sequence (si )i ∈J over the alphabet A. Depending on sta-
tistical properties (see Figure 5), these sequences can be modelled
using n-grams and used to anomaly detection as described in rest
of the paper.
An n-gram is any sequence of contiguous messages. For a fixed
value of n, based on the Markov assumption [20], a probability
for each n-gram can be estimated using the Maximum Likelihood
Estimator (MLE) method. Markov assumption describes a property
in a stochastic process that the occurrence of an event(s) only
depends on a short history. In other words, instead of computing
the probability of occurrence a message given its entire history,
we can approximate the history by just the last few messages. For
example, in the bigram model
P(sm |s1s2s3...s(m−1)) ≈ P(sm |s(m−1)), (1)
in the trigram model
P(sm |s1s2s3...s(m−1)) ≈ P(sm |s(m−2)s(m−1)) (2)
and, in general, the n-gram model
P(sm |s1s2...s(m−1)) ≈ P(sm |s(m+1−n)s(m+2−n)...s(m−1)) (3)
and so on. Equation 3 can be extended for any value of n, and by
taking relative frequency counts (C), we can estimate MLE for each
n-grams. For example in the trigram model,




In principal, with a large enough corpus of CAN messages for
normal driving behaviour, we can compute these counts and esti-
mate the probability from equation 4. But, in practice, there might
be unseen n-grams to the system that does not appear in the train-
ing corpus. Different smoothing techniques have been proposed to
overcome this situation [4]. We use a technique proposed in [14]
for this purpose.
3.2 Context-aware anomaly detection
Since the CAN IDs and their purpose is not generally shared by
the vehicle manufacturer, it is not possible to identify the exact
function of a CAN message, therefore, the “context” learned from
normal driving behaviour is essential to identify anomalous mes-
sages respect to the learned context.
For example, a benign context can consist of driving with a speed
of 60 MPH, infotainment system is on, cruise control is on, and AC
is operating on a certain temperature. Subject to a certain varia-
tion, this will produce a set of message sequences (si )i ∈J that can
predict the expected behaviour with respect to the learned context.
A message to open the door at this instance would be certainly an
“out-of-context” message that would not occur in normal circum-
stances. In the proposed algorithm, even though we do not know
the exact nature of the messages that are being sent, we can still
contextualise the scenario to identify malicious behaviour by using
a sequence of messages and its frequency of appearance, which
allows to predict a set of benign messages that should follow as
part of that context.
When an attack progresses on the CAN bus, malicious activities
can occur in an on-off pattern in the time line. This occurrence can
be one time or a recurrence, and as a result, lack of agreement or
harmony between points in (si )i ∈J can occur in a similar or different
on-off fashion. However, in a Car attack, malicious CAN messages
can be exactly same as benign messages in terms of protocol data
unit (PDU) structure, but the context they come into the scene
may be different. To elaborate this further, as an example, take
harsh braking scenario on a motorway which can be used either
for malicious or benign purposes. An intruder can take over the
control of a fast moving vehicle and apply harsh breaking with
no driver intervention to instigate a collision. But in the benign
case, driver will apply harsh breaking with other controls (e.g.
steering, releasing accelerator, etc) in order to prevent a collision.
We argue that these two scenarios are different in the context
and produce two different message sequences, say (smi )i ∈J and












































































































































Figure 2: Illustrative diagram for the message sequence modelling on the CAN bus for anomaly detection: the input is a
sequence of CAN messages while the output is a label assigned for the input.
(sbj )j ∈J on the CAN bus. Though there can can be many overlaps
between (smi )i ∈J and (sbj )j ∈J, however, there would be a very small
chance both sequences to be identical, especially, for all possible
n values in n-gram modelling. This difference can be captured via
carefully trained mathematical models and used to distinguish two
different scenarios. A recent work [7] supports towards this claim
in which authors use in-vehicle sensor data on the CAN bus for
driver fingerprinting. As per authors, using less than 8 minutes
of training data, they were able to differentiate 15 drivers using
the same vehicle (popular 2009 sedan) with 100% accuracy. The
objective of our algorithm is to detect context dependent anomalies
using CAN messages and hence to add security intelligence to the
modern automobile.
3.3 Anomaly certainty ratio (λω )
An anomaly is an irregularity of data patterns (or points) which
deviates from expected (or normal) behaviour. The simple approach
to anomaly detection is to define a region representing expected
values and declare any observation lies outside that region as an
anomaly [13]. To this end we define an anomaly certainty ratio (λω )
for a smaller observation window ω in the the time line as follows.
Given the history hi = {s1s2...si−1} of ith message si , using n-
grams, we predict a set of expected values Θ for si . If the observed
value for si lies outside the predicted values then a weak anomaly
is declared at point of si . The process repeats for all messages in ω,
and then λω is computed as follows.
λω =
C(# weak anomalies in ω)
C(# benign messages in ω) (5)
Counting relatively weak anomalies over an observation window
helps to reduce false positives. We use λω as a measurement of
suspicion for a ongoing attack during the ω. Algorithm 1 presents
the procedure for computing the λω .
3.4 Kernel density for threshold estimation
In probability theory, the distribution of a continuous random vari-
able can be characterised using its probability density function
(pdf). The pdf describes the likelihood of taking a given value by
a random variable. This is an important property which can be
used for anomaly detection, as an observation lies in a very low
density region of the pdf can be considered as an anomaly. We
utilise this property to define a threshold (T ) for the benign region
of λω values, and hence to anomaly detection. To this end we need
to obtain the pdf of our target variable λω . A variety of approaches
Algorithm 1 Procedure for computing the λω
global variables
ν , Pre-built n-grams models
T , Pre-defined threshold
ω, Observation window size
λω , Anomaly certainty ratio
end global variables
procedure ComputeAnomalyCertaintyRatio(ν ,ω)
k , Maximum length of n-grams to use
Θ, Best candidates for si
if ω > 0 then
read (si )i ∈J in ω
foreach si ∈ ω do
Take hi for si , i.e. the last k-1 messages of the corre-
sponding k-gram
Using ν , predict the next message for hi
Returns the best candidate messages Θ for the si
if si < Θ then
Declare a weak anomaly at point of si
end
end
λω ← C(Number of weak anomalies in ω)C(Number of benign messages in ω)







are available for this purpose [24], the most basic form is using a
re-scaled histogram (see Figure 3).
However, in histograms, the shape of a distribution is strongly
affected by the number of bins used, hence not an effective way
of estimating the density function. To avoid this weakness, Kernel
density plots estimation was employed in this work. Kernel density
estimation is a non-parametric way of constructing an estimate,
based on observed data, of an unobserved underlying probability
density function of a random variable. Figure 4 presents the Kernel
density plot obtained for the random variable λω , only using train-
ing (benign) data captured during a period of normal driving. Note
that vertical axis in this graph represents densities (probabilities per
unit), but not the actual probabilities, hence its values can exceed 1.
As seen in figure 4, p(λω > 0.26) = 0. In other words, according to




























































































































































Figure 3: Re-scaled histogram for the training data with a
normal curve fitted.
the pdf, there is a zero probability to take values greater than 0.26
by λω if we computed it using benign data. Hence any observation
taken λω > 0.26 can be considered as an anomaly, i.e. T = 0.26.











Figure 4: Threshold (T) estimation: Kernel density function
obtained for the training data.
4 EXPERIMENTAL SETTING, RESULTS &
DISCUSSION
In this section we apply our algorithm to a dataset captured from a
real vehicle to demonstrate its validity in practice.
4.1 Dataset description
We use a publicly available dataset provided by Hacking and Coun-
termeasures Research Lab (HCRL) [17]. According to the authors,
the dataset was constructed by logging CAN traffic via the OBD-II
port from a real vehicle while message injection attacks were being
performed. HCRL provides dedicated datasets for the benign be-
haviour and each different attack types. Benign set contains 6082544
of CAN messages produced during a 50 minutes of normal driving
time. Each attack dataset contain 300 intrusions of message injec-
tion. Each intrusion is performed for 3-5 seconds, and each dataset
has a collection of 30-40 minutes of CAN traffic.
We perform our tests and analysis using benign traffic and traf-
fic traces from two spoofing attacks, which are spoofing engine
round per minute (RPM) and gear gauge CAN messages. Spoofing
attacks is defined as injecting messages of specific CAN IDs every
1 millisecond related to RPM and gear gauge information.
There are multiple attributes of the HCRL dataset, which are
Timestamp, CAN ID, DLC, DATA[0-7], and Flag. Those attributes
are defined as follows
(1) Timestamp : is the recorded time in seconds.
(2) CAN ID : is the identifier of CAN message in HEX.
(3) DLC : is the number of data bytes, ranging from 0 to 8.
(4) DATA[0-7] : is the data value (byte)
(5) Flag : There are two distinct flags, T and R, representing
injected messages and normal messages respectively.
4.2 Experimental design
As mentioned earlier, we train our models only using benign traffic
traces, taking so called one class based modelling approach [6, 12].
The idea here is to create the model only using benign instances,
and then use the trained model to identify new/unknown instances.
If the target-data is too different from the training instances then it
is reported as suspicious. To this end we split benign traffic traces
into two parts: training (80%) and testing (20%), but keep unchanged
the temporal order of message sequences. Training set was used to
build n-gram models and also to estimate the threshold value (T )
which was at λ = 0.26.
In order to create the test set, which includes both benign and
malicious traffic instances, above benign test set (i.e. remaining
20%) was merged with malicious traffic traces, and then resulted
data set was split into 100 milliseconds smaller windows (ω). In our
test set, attacks start at window number 676 in the time line and
then continue as time progresses (see figures 6 and 7). We created
two different test sets for RMP message spoofing attack and Gear
gauge message spoofing attack in order to investigate algorithm’s
ability to detect them in isolation.
We implemented the monitoring algorithm using R and Bash
scripts and run our experiments on a mobile workstation with an
Intel CoreTM i7-6820HQ CPU and 32GB of RAM, by replaying the
traffic traces in the test set.
4.3 Results & discussion
Figure 5 shows histograms of top 50 n-grams for n=1,2,3,4. Notice
the case of 1-grams, a few message IDs have very high relative
frequencies, for example, the one-gram “0153” appears 320000 times,
followed by a set of 10 message IDs which appear 280000 times.


























































































































































































































































































































Figure 5: The top 50 n-gram distributions for n=1, 2, 3, 4.
The most common messages rapidly decrease in frequency. After
the top 30 terms, the frequency of the next common 1-gram is
below 10000. As we move forward in terms of the order of the
n-grams, the frequencies drop but the distributions become more
skewed to the left. For instance, the top 4-gram “0316 018f 0260
02a0”appears 130476 times. As we see in the plot, the top 50 4-grams
occur between 14333 and 130476 times. This exploratory analysis
discloses an interesting property in the CAN data, i.e. certain n-
grams have higher probabilities to occur while others have lower
probabilities to occur. This is an interesting property to observe as it
would be useful in our probabilistic modelling, and also occurrence
of an event(s) depends only on a short history.
Figures 6 and 7 present the outcomes which includes 3.3 minutes
duration snapshot of the monitoring period. As seen in graphs,
while both attacks progress, anomaly certainty ratio λω is fluctu-
ating far above the threshold value T . This may be due to, during
the attack period, message spoofing packets have been injected in
regular time intervals. If λω > T we alert suspicious activity in a
smaller window ω, otherwise benign behaviour.
It would be worth to mention here that the two second rule
in driving - the safe trailing distance at any speed which a driver
should maintain. Ability to detect suspicious activities using far
smaller time windows (100 milliseconds in our case) by our algo-
rithm should be acknowledged. It allows either vehicle operator or
vehicle itself enough time to react in advance when an incident is
alerted by the monitoring system. This is essential for a practically
deployable automotive cyber security solution. Thus proposed al-
gorithm is a practical automated solution for anomaly detection on
the CAN bus.
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Securing automotive controller area networks has proven to be a
necessity considering how cyber attacks can have highly disruptive
or even deadly consequences. In this paper, we have proposed
a context-aware anomaly detection algorithm where a regularly
updated anomaly certainty ratio λω is computed to determine the
level of suspicious to identify the out of context messages. Results
illustrate how the proposed algorithm is capable of successfully
identify the deployed attacks with 100% accuracy.
In this paper, we have used the data set presented by the Hack-
ing and Countermeasures Research Lab (HCRL), where benign and
attack data is collected from a single vehicle. Further investigation
will explore the performance of the proposed algorithm using dif-
ferent data sets with data collected from multiple vehicles within
multiple scenarios. Additionally, more attack scenarios will be in-
vestigated in addition to the currently deployed message spoofing
attacks to provide wider comprehension of the performance of the
proposed algorithm under different circumstances.
Our goal is to build a fully automated and effective anomaly
detection system for automotive Cyber Security. The performance
of the algorithm will be central to address scale. It is not clear at this
stage where the bottleneck will be when we deploy our approach to







































































































































































Figure 6: Monitoring for RPM message spoofing attack:
Green line denotes λω values during the benign data. Red
line denotes λω values during the attack data. Blue dotted
line denotes the threshold T at λω = 0.26.

























Figure 7: Monitoring for Gear gauge message spoofing at-
tack: Green line denotes λω values during the benign data.
Red line denotes λω values during the attack data. Blue dot-
ted line denotes the threshold T at λω = 0.26.
real life applications in production environments. With help from
our industry partner HORIBA MIRA Ltd., further work will focus
on identifying these bottlenecks to optimise the proposed algorithm.
As discussed in section 3.2, distinguishing unique scenarios like
emergency breaks under all conditions would be challenging as
modelling such benign out of context scenarios will not be trivial.
We hope to investigate this extensively in the future.
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